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Abstract²Supply chains have become complex and 
vulnerable and therefore, researchers are developing effective 
techniques in order to capture the complex structure of the 
supply network and interdependency between supply chain risks. 
Researchers have recently started using Bayesian Belief 
Networks for modelling supply chain risks. However, these 
models are still focused on limited domains of supply chain risk 
management like supplier selection, supplier performance 
evaluation and ranking. We have developed a comprehensive risk 
management process using Bayesian networks that captures all 
three stages of risk management including risk identification, 
risk assessment and risk evaluation. Our proposed new risk 
measures and evaluation scheme of different combinations of 
control strategies are considered as an important contribution to 
the literature. We have modelled supply network as a Bayesian 
Belief Network incorporating the supply network configuration, 
probabilistic interdependency between risks, resulting losses, risk 
mitigation control strategies and associated costs. An illustrative 
example is presented and three different models are solved 
corresponding to different risk attitudes of the decision maker. 
Based on our results, it is not always viable to implement control 
strategy at the most important risk factor because of the 
consideration of mitigation cost, relative loss and probabilistic 
interdependency between connected risk factors. 
Keywords²supply chain risks; Bayesian Belief Networks; 
control strategies; risk measures 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Supply chains have become complex because of the 
globalization and outsourcing in manufacturing industries. 
Supply chain risk management (SCRM) is an active area of 
research that deals with the overall management of the risk 
events ranging across the entire spectrum of the supply chain 
including external risk factors. Supply chain risk is 
characterized by both the probability of an event and its 
severity given that an event occurs [1]. Following three 
components are found in all conceptualizations of risk [2]: 
x Probability (likelihood) of the occurrence of an event 
that leads to realization of the risk 
x Potential losses in case of realization of risk 
x Significance of the consequences of losses 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) have started gaining the 
interest of researchers in modelling supply chain risks [3]. 
BBNs offer a unique feature of modelling risks combining both 
the statistical data and subjective judgment in case of non-
availability of data [4-6]. Researchers have used BBNs to 
model specific domains of supply chain risks and validated 
these models through case studies. BBN is a graphical 
representation of causal relationships between variables and 
associated uncertainty in the dependency in terms of 
conditional probabilities [4]. The variables are represented by 
nodes while an arc (directed between two nodes) represents 
direct causal relationship.  
Research Gap and Contribution 
Existing research in SCRM has not addressed a very 
important issue of evaluating different combinations of 
mitigation strategies in a setting of interconnected network of 
supply chain actors, corresponding risks, resulting losses, and 
costs and benefits associated with potential strategies. We 
utilize BBNs in bridging this major research gap and evaluate 
different combinations of mitigation strategies. Furthermore, 
we also introduce new risk measures for evaluating risk 
exposure of the supply network and incorporate risk attitude of 
the decision maker in our model using the feature of utility 
function. 
Outline 
Literature review including discussion on limitations of the 
existing BBN based models is briefly presented in Section II. 
We propose new risk measures and modelling approach in 
Section III. An illustrative example of a supply network 
including the modelling parameters is presented in Section IV. 
Results are presented and discussed in Section V followed by 
the conclusion and future research presented in Section VI. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Supply Chain Risk Management 
³6&50 LV WKH PDQDgement of supply chain risks through 
coordination or collaboration amongst the supply chain 
SDUWQHUV VR DV WR HQVXUH SURILWDELOLW\ DQG FRQWLQXLW\´ [7]. 
³6&50DLPVWRLGHQWLI\WKHSRWHQWLDOVRXUFHVRIVXSSO\FKDLQ
risk and implement appropriate actions to avoid or contain 
VXSSO\FKDLQYXOQHUDELOLW\´ [8]. Vulnerability is defined as an 
exposure to serious disturbances from risks within the SC as 
well as risks external to the SC [9]. Supply chain risk is an 
event that may cause disruption to the flow of activities within 
the supply chain. Following are important themes for future 
research in the field of SCRM [10]: 
x Holistic methods for capturing interdependencies 
between risk factors across entire supply network 
x Organizational level studies for gauging maturity level 
x Disruption propagation and reliability of an entire 
network 
x Synergy of supply chain risk management and project 
risk management in new product development 
x Mechanism design for mitigating strategic risks 
x Supply chain risk management practices in small and 
medium enterprises 
Bayesian Belief Network based Modelling Approaches 
Few researchers have applied BBNs in SCRM. BBNs are 
helpful in benchmarking supplier risk profiles and identifying 
ULVNHYHQWVKDYLQJODUJHVWSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWRQDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
revenues [11]. In one of the studies involving BBNs, suppliers 
are benchmarked against their risks based on the sensitivity 
analysis [12]. However, a major limitation of the study is 
difficulty to get data from current and potential suppliers in 
populating the model. 
BBNs have been applied in managing risks associated with 
large engineering project and developing a model for 
quantifying the risk of project delay in Korean shipbuilding 
industries [13]. Combination of BBNs and Total Cost of 
Ownership method was used for selection of potential suppliers 
that demonstrated suitability of BBNs for modeling risks in 
case of bX\HU¶VLQFRPSOHWHNQRZOHGJH about the suppliers [14]. 
Limitations of existing BBN based Models 
The main limitation of all these studies is application of 
BBNs in specific domain of Supply Network. None of the 
mentioned studies has captured holistic dynamics of the 
interacting risks. Furthermore, the models do not segregate 
risks into triggers, risk events and consequences. These models 
do not consider two important aspects of associating loss value 
to each risk and considering the influence of mitigation 
strategies on these risks.  
In a recent study [15], supply chain process and risks 
corresponding to various segments of the supply network are 
combined and modelled as a BBN. New risk measures are also 
proposed in order to identify important elements within the 
supply network. However, the computation of proposed risk 
measures may not be possible in case of a supply network 
having complex structure. Furthermore, the proposed model 
describes risk analysis under a given configuration whereas it 
is equally important to consider the impact of various risk 
mitigation strategies across various segments of the network.  
III. PROPOSED BBN BASED MODEL OF A SUPPLY NETWORK 
A. Mathematical Representation 
A discrete supply chain risk network ܰ ൌ ሺܺǡ ܩǡ ܲǡ ܮሻ is a 
four-tuple consisting of 
x a directed acyclic graph ሺܦܣܩሻ,ܩ ൌ ሺܸǡ ܧሻ, with 
nodes, ܸ, representing discrete risk events, ܺோ, discrete 
control strategies, ௌܺ,  and loss functions, ܮ, and 
directed links, ܧ, encoding dependence relations 
x a set of conditional probability distributions, ܲ, 
containing a distribution, ܲ൫ܺோ೔หܺ௣௔ሺோ೔ሻ൯,  for each risk 
event, ܺோ೔ 
x a set of loss functions, ܮ, containing one loss function, ݈ሺܺ௣௔ሺ௏ሻሻ, for each node ݒ in the subset ௟ܸ א ܸ of loss 
nodes. 
 ܧܮሺܺሻ ൌ ෑ ܲሺܺ௩ȁܺ௣௔ሺ௩ሻሻ ෍ ݈ሺܺ௣௔ሺ௪ሻሻ௪א௏ಽ௑ೡא௑ೃ  (1) 
where ܧܮሺܺሻis the expected loss across entire supply 
network 
1) Standard configuration (SC): Supply network is 
considered to be in its standard configuration when all the 
control strategies selected in the BBN reflect real-time profile 
of these strategies in the supply network. 
2) Contingency configuration (CC): Supply network is 
considered to be in its contingency configuration when all the 
control strategies in the BBN are selected against the multi-
criteria decision making of maximizing weighted summation 
of expected utility corresponding to loss exposure and utility 
of mitigation cost.  
B. Risk Measures 
1) Loss Propagation Containment Measure (LPCM): Loss 
propagation containment measure is the ratio between relative 
improvement in the network expected loss corresponding to 
complete mitigation of the risk factor and network expected 
loss for the standard configuration. 
 
 ܮܲܥܯ௑ೃ೔ ൌ ܧܮሺܺሻ െ ܧܮሺܺȁܺோ೔ ൌ ݂݈ܽݏ݁ሻܧܮሺܺሻௌ஼  (2) 
 
 ܣݒ݃Ǥ ܮܲܥܯሺܮܲܥܯതതതതതതതതሻ ൌ  ?Ȁ݊ ෍ ܮܲܥܯ௑ೃ೔௡ଵ  (3) 
 
2) Loss Propagation Spread Measure (LPSM): Loss 
propagation spread measure is the ratio between range of 
network expected loss corresponding to the two extreme states 
of the risk factor and network expected loss for the standard 
configuration. 
 ܮܲܵܯ௑ೃ೔ ൌ ܧܮሺܺȁܺோ೔ ൌ ݐݎݑ݁ሻ െ ܧܮሺܺȁܺோ೔ ൌ ݂݈ܽݏ݁ሻܧܮሺܺሻௌ஼  (4) 
 
 ܣݒ݃Ǥ ܮܲܵܯሺܮܲܵܯതതതതതതതതሻ ൌ  ?Ȁ݊ ෍ ܮܲܵܯ௑ೃ೔௡ଵ  (5) 
C. Problem Statement 
Given different levels of control strategies and associated 
costs available at different nodes of the supply network, what is 
the optimal combination of these control strategies yielding 
maximum utility for the decision maker? 
D. Objective Function 
The objective function is to select a specific combination of 
control strategies that would maximize the weighted sum of 
normalized expected utility for loss exposure and normalized 
utility of cost related to implementing control strategies for the 
decision maker. 
 ݉ܽݔఊೣೞאఊ೉ೄ ݓ כ ܧܷതതതതሺ ܺఊೣೞሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ݓሻ כ ഥܷሺܥఊೣ ೞ ሻ (6) 
 ܧܷሺܺሻ ൌ ෑ ܲሺܺ௩ȁܺ௣௔ሺ௩ሻሻ ෍ ݑ൫ܺ௣௔ሺ௪ሻ൯௪א௏ೆ௑ೡא௑ೃ  (7) 
where ߛ௑ೄ is a set of all possible orderings of different 
states of  control strategies ሺݔ௦భ ൈ ݔ௦మ ൈ ǥൈ ݔ௦೙ሻ  ݓ is the relative importance of the utility for loss exposure ܧܷതതതതሺܺሻis the normalized expected utility of the decision 
maker for loss exposure ܥఊೣೞ  is the cost of implementing ߛ௫ೞ combination of control 
strategies 
ഥܷሺܥሻ is the normalized utility of cost related to 
implementing control strategies 
IV. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
We have used the same hypothetical supply network that 
was presented in a recent study [15] and modelled it using 
GeNIe [16] as shown in Fig. 1. The supply network comprises 
6 elements and 12 associated risk factors. Supply network 
elements comprise combination of physical locations and 
transportation links. Risk factors representing uncertain events 
are shown as oval shaped nodes. Nomenclature appearing at 
the top of each risk factor represents its unique risk number 
followed by the respective supply network element (shown in 
parenthesis). Raw material source (RM) provides material to 
each of the two manufacturers (M1 and M2). The 
manufacturers supply finished goods to the warehouse (W) that 
are further transported to a retailer (R) through the 
transportation link of W-R. $OO ULVN IDFWRUV H[FHSW µIORRG¶
(R12) are connected with discrete decision nodes (rectangle 
shaped) representing control strategies having two states of 
µ<HV¶DQGµ1R¶/RVVYDOXH (represented by a diamond shaped 
node) of each risk event is same for the two states of control 
strategy; however, implementation of a control strategy reduces 
the (conditional) probability values of the relevant risk factor at 
some cost. (Conditional) probability and loss values for each 
risk factor are shown in Table I. Shaded cells represent 
FRQGLWLRQDO SUREDELOLW\ YDOXHV FRUUHVSRQGLQJ WR WKH µ<HV¶
state of associated control strategy. Three models were 
developed representing different risk attitudes of a decision 
maker assuming values shown in Table II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Supply network modelled as a BBN. 
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TABLE II.  ASSUMED PARAMETERS 
Parameter Assumption ݓ  ?Ǥ ? ݑሺݔሻ݂݋ݎݎ݅ݏ݇ െ ݊݁ݑݐݎ݈ܽ െݔ ݑሺݔሻ݂݋ݎݎ݅ݏ݇ െ ݐܽ݇݅݊݃ െݔଶ ݑሺݔሻ݂݋ݎݎ݅ݏ݇ െ ܽݒ݁ݎݏ݁ െ ?ݔ ഥܷሺܥሻ  ? െ ܿ݋ݏݐȀ݉ܽݔܿ݋ݏݐ 
 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
After running the models corresponding to three different 
risk attitudes of the decision maker, values were generated in 
GeNIe and subsequently exported to Microsoft Excel for 
evaluation of risk measures and utility values concerning 
various combinations of control strategies. In case of a risk-
neutral decision maker, maximizing combination of expected 
utility for loss and utility for strategy cost resulted in the 
selection of control strategies as shown in Table III. Values of 
the risk measures for all risk factors under contingency 
configuration are graphically represented as Fig. 2. It is 
pertinent to mention that the total mitigation cost for the 
optimal combination can be allocated in different ways across 
the network and all such combinations except the optimal one 
would be inefficient as shown in Fig. 3.  
A risk factor having low values for both the measures is 
considered as insignificant in terms of risk management as it 
will not have a major impact on the network in case of 
disruption and furthermore, the network will not benefit much 
from the its improvement as well. R7 can be categorized as the 
least important risk factor within the cohort. A risk factor 
having greater values against the two measures must be 
critically monitored and a control strategy implemented. R9 is 
the most important risk factor having maximum values against 
the risk measures. It is also counter-intuitive to note that R9 is 
not considered for implementing a control strategy although it 
is scored as the top ranking risk factor. This unique result 
manifests the importance of our modelling scheme which takes 
into consideration different factors including probabilistic 
interdependency between risks, resulting losses, impact of 
control strategies and associated cost. 
TABLE III.  OPTIMAL COMBINATION OF CONTROL STRATEGIES (RISK-
NEUTRAL DECISION MAKER) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average LPCM represents the average value of LPCM for 
all the risk factors. Variation of this important measure is 
shown in Fig. 4 with respect to all possible combinations of 
available control strategies. As there are 11 control strategies 
available across the supply network with each strategy having 
two states, there are a total of 2048 different combinations of 
control strategies. The graph represents average LPCM values 
for all these 2048 strategies. Corresponding to a specific budget 
allocation for implementing a control strategy, there is a unique 
optimal combination of resource allocation across the network 
in order to achieve the minimum value of average LPCM. All 
such points are shown in red colour representing the minimum 
points against specific mitigation cost. It is also evident from 
the graph that average LPCM value starts increasing close to 
770 units of mitigation cost and gets back to the same value 
close to 1000 units of cost. Therefore, it will not be feasible to 
invest between the range of costs keeping into account the 
main objective of improving the average value of LPCM.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Risk measures of the supply network under contingency configuration 
(risk-neutral decision maker).  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Variation of network expected loss with all possible combinations of 
control strategies. 
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 Fig. 4. Variation of average LPCM with all possible combinations of control 
strategies. 
Average LPSM represents the average value of LPSM for 
all the risk factors. Variation of this important measure is 
shown in Fig. 5 with respect to all possible combinations of 
available control strategies. Corresponding to a specific budget 
allocation for implementing a control strategy, there is a unique 
optimal combination of resource allocation across the network 
in order to achieve the minimum value of average LPSM. All 
such points are shown in red colour representing the minimum 
points against specific mitigation cost. The rate of 
improvement of this measure declines with the increase in 
mitigation cost. Average LPSM represents the extent to which 
the network is protected against the potential disruptions and 
the decrease in this measure implies reduction in the 
dependency between risks across the network. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Variation of average LPSM with all possible combinations of control 
strategies. 
Utility of the risk-neutral decision maker was calculated 
against all possible combinations of control strategies as shown 
in Fig. 6. It is evident from the graph that there can be a 
number of combinations of control strategies against specific 
budget allocation; however, only a unique combination results 
in maximizing the utility value. Red coloured points represent 
all such combinations that maximize the utility values against 
specific mitigation cost. The maximum utility value is 0.63 
corresponding to the total mitigation cost of 470 units.  
 
Fig. 6. Variation of utility for risk-neutral decision maker with all possible 
combinations of control strategies. 
Utility of the risk-averse decision maker was calculated 
against all possible combinations of control strategies as shown 
in Fig. 7. Red coloured points represent all combinations of 
control strategies that maximize the utility values against 
specific mitigation cost. The maximum utility value is 0.65 
corresponding to the mitigation cost of 540 units. It is 
important to consider that equal weightage was assigned to the 
two attributes of utility of cost and expected utility of loss. 
Risk-averse decision makers might allocate higher weightage 
to the expected utility of loss and it might influence the results. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Variation of utility for risk-averse decision maker with all possible 
combinations of control strategies. 
Utility of the risk-taking decision maker was calculated 
against all possible combinations of control strategies as shown 
in Fig. 8. Red coloured points represent all combinations of 
control strategies that maximize the utility values against 
specific mitigation cost. The maximum utility value is 0.62 
corresponding to the mitigation cost of 440 units. It is 
important to consider that equal weightage was assigned to the 
two attributes of utility of cost and expected utility of loss. 
Risk-taking decision makers might allocate lower weightage to 
the expected utility of loss and it might influence the results. In 
contrast to the previous two graphs, there is a decreasing trend 
in the maximum utility values with increase in mitigation cost 
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and it can be justified on the basis of low importance of 
expected loss for the risk-taking decision maker. 
 
Fig. 8. Variation of utility for risk-taking decision maker with all possible 
combinations of control strategies. 
Maximum utility values for all three risk attitudes of the 
decision maker are plotted against mitigation cost in Fig. 9. 
There is a discontinuity close to 770 units of mitigation cost 
because certain mitigation control implemented at that cost 
might not be included in the combinations considered beyond 
that cost and once it is included again in the package, the 
benefits would realize but the cost would outweigh these 
benefits. For risk-taking decision maker, the utility starts 
declining earlier. Furthermore, for the first part of graph before 
the discontinuity, risk-averse decision maker generally gets 
higher utility values. 
It is also important to consider the variation of maximum 
expected utility values for loss and utility for cost 
corresponding to three different risk attitudes with mitigation 
cost as shown in Fig. 10. Utility function of cost was assumed 
as linear. For risk-neutral decision maker, expected utility 
graph for loss is the mirror reflection of expected loss graph. 
For costs below 770 units, risk-taking decision maker generally 
gets the least utility values; however, after the discontinuity, 
the situation is different because there is a sharp increase in 
expected loss that increases the disutility for the other types of 
decision maker more than that for the risk-taking one. 
We have proposed new risk measures and a novel method 
of managing supply chain risks taking into consideration all 
three stages of risk management. It is important to consider the 
loss values and mitigation strategies including associated costs 
within the model. Our proposed method also captures risk 
attitude of the decision maker as the stakeholders might have 
different attitudes towards managing risks. The method can be 
used for gauging the importance of risk factors and supply 
network elements under standard configuration and selecting 
optimal combination of control strategies under contingency 
configuration. We have bridged the research gap of using 
BBNs in SCRM encompassing all three stages of risk 
management; risk identification, risk assessment and risk 
evaluation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Variation of maximum utility values for three different risk attitudes with mitigation cost.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Supply chain risk management is an active area of research. 
Researchers are developing robust and effective techniques in 
order to manage the complex interaction of risk factors across 
the global supply chains. Bayesian networks have been applied 
in specific domains of supply chain risk management; 
however, the existing models do not encompass all three stages 
of risk management. We have proposed modelling a supply 
network as a Bayesian belief network capturing network 
configuration, probabilistic interdependency between risk 
factors, resulting losses, control strategies and associated costs. 
Our proposed risk measures represent the importance of risk 
factors in terms of their contribution towards the loss 
propagation across the entire network.  
We were able to demonstrate the application of our 
proposed method through modelling a simple illustrative 
supply network. The modelling approach is considered to be an 
important contribution to the existing literature as it bridges the 
research gap of modelling interdependency between supply 
chain risks encompassing all stages of risk management. Our 
model can also facilitate solving different objective functions 
in accordance with the risk attitude of decision maker. It is 
evident from our results that it is only possible to evaluate the 
merits of different combinations of risk mitigation strategies 
after considering the respective costs into the model and 
without adopting such approach and relying only on the 
probabilistic interaction might not help in taking optimal 
decisions. Future research might focus on the application of 
this modelling approach in a real case study. 
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